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This paper discusses the situation of minorities in Japan from the 
perspective of citizenship. I use the term ‘citizenship’ as defined by the 
British sociologist T.H. Marshall, who extended its definition beyond the 
political and legal status and recognized its three aspects: the political, the 
civil and the social. Whereas political citizenship means the right to active 
participation in political life, civil citizenship denotes freedom of speech, 
thought and religion, and the right to property and justice. The last one, 
social citizenship, upholds the right to security, to economic welfare and to 
the life of a “civilised being as determined by the standards prevailing in 
the society” (Marshall 1950: 10). The three aspects are mutually 
interwoven: a lack of political citizenship often determines one’s economic 
status and vice versa, rich people enjoy greater power in politics. But the 
point is that citizenship denotes not only passive tatus, but also dynamic 
participation; it is not only about rights, but also about having an ability to 
exercise one’s rights. Hence the problems of marginlization lie often not 
in the sphere of law and paragraphs, but in social rel tions. 
What Japanese minorities share in common is that they are in various ways 
disadvantaged in terms of citizenship. The most drastic case is that of 
Zainichi Koreans1 who have been living in Japan for four generations 
without legal citizenship, being thus barred from social privileges protected 
by the citizenship proviso. The Ainu, burakumin, and Okinawans still have 
to cope with the legacy of social marginalization and, as Japanese citizens, 
cannot fully enjoy all rights and privileges they are entitled to. All 
minorities lag behind the social mainstream in terms of access to welfare. 
The Ainu and burakumin are still under-represented among highly 
qualified professionals (academic teachers, lawyers, physicians, company 
managers etc.) and the Okinawans cannot fully exercise their civil rights, 
being sacrificed to the imperative of the Japanese-Am rican alliance. 
In terms of ethnic diversity, Japan is a relatively heterogeneous country, 
falling into the same rank as Germany, Lebanon and the Netherlands 
(Sugimoto 2002: 7), where minority groups make up 3-6 per cent of 
population. If we include the three million buraku people, who are 
                                                   
1 Zainichi (lit. “residing in Japan”) is a popular name for the Korean and Taiwanese diasporas in 
Japan. Hereafter, I use, interchangeably, the terms “Zainichi” and “Zainichi Koreans”. 
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ethnically Japanese but treated like outcastes, the proportion of minorities 
may rise up to 6-8 per cent. What makes it difficult to estimate the number 
of minority people in Japan is that the government, with the sole exception 
of the Ainu, does not acknowledge the existence of any ethnic minorities 
and thus no statistical data is kept regarding this matter. Anyone who holds 
Japanese citizenship is simply considered Japanese and his/her racial or 
ethnic background is irrelevant (Wetherall 2008: 280-81). Zainichi are 
regarded as foreigners and registered as ‘special permanent residents’, but 
official statistics do not include Zainichi who chose to naturalize or who 
were born to Japanese-Korean families and thus inherited citizenship from 
a Japanese parent. There is no such category as ‘Okinawan’ or ‘burakumin’. 
Consequently, no one is entitled to claim any distinctive rights based upon 
his/her ethnic background and the government refuses to grant any 
collective rights to minority people. By the some token, anyone who 
wishes to naturalize is expected to assimilate and cut off his/her ethnic 
roots. Zainichi children are free to attend Korean schools as long as they do 
not hold Japanese citizenship, but if they naturalize they must follow the 
Japanese curriculum and their right to Korean education is not recognized. 
The reason why Japan stubbornly refuses to acknowledge its diversity can 
partially be ascribed to the myth of racial homogeneity, which prevailed in 
the political discourse of postwar Japan. This myth enabled the Japanese to 
distance themselves from their colonial past. It also became an ideological 
cornerstone of the economic miracle. Although during the past thirty years 
Japan has significantly changed its policy towards minority groups, being 
pressed by obligations towards international covenants on human rights, it 
still has not dealt with the legacy of the ideology of homogeneity. 
All minorities in Japan, including the buraku people, claim a distinctive 
identity. The Ainu define themselves as ‘indigenous people’. The 
Okinawans claim the right to nationhood as successors of the historical 
heritage of the Ryukyu Kingdom, and Zainichi Koreans see themselves as 
an ethnic minority, either as ‘Korean residents in Japan’ or as ‘Japanese of 
Korean background’. What interests us is how they translate their claims 
into political actions. And here we can make an interesting observation. 
Whereas the Ainu and Koreans demand recognition as an ethnic minority, 
this is not necessarily the case with the Okinawans. The Ainu and Zainichi 
demand not only official recognition, but also collective rights that would 
respect their peculiar position in Japanese society. In that sense they 
challenge the notion of Japanese citizenship in which the idea of 
homogeneity is embedded. The Okinawans, on the other hand, seem to be 
not interested in bargaining for any collective rights. The main objective of 
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their fight is to force the Japanese authorities to respect their constitutional 
rights. In other words, they do not demand any rights as Okinawans, but 
want to be treated equally like other ordinary citizens. In that sense they do 
not pose any threat to the institution of homogenous citizenship. 
 
The Zainichi 
Zainichi Koreans are a legacy of the Japanese occupation of Korea in 
1910-1945. During the interwar period, thousands of K rean economic 
migrants arrived each year in Japan with the hope of starting a better life. 
Hundred of thousands of conscripts arrived in Japan during the last years 
of World War II to work in mines and armaments factories. In August 1945, 
over two million Koreans welcomed the end of the war on Japanese soil. 
The majority of them returned home within the next two years, but more 
than 600,000 decided to stay in Japan and wait until the political situation 
on the peninsula was settled. The outbreak of the Korean War not only 
halted the repatriation process, but brought about a reverse migration. The 
Japanese government, on the other hand, was awaiting the moment it could 
deal with the problem without interference from theSupreme Commander 
of the Allied Powers. In April 1952, just ten days before Japan regained 
sovereignty, the government issued circular no. 438, according to which all 
Japanese citizens with Korean or Taiwanese family registers (koseki) were 
stripped of citizenship (Kashiwazaki 2000: 22-23; Chee 1982: 21). This 
strengthened the institutional marginalization of the Korean community, as 
they became barred from jobs in public administration and denied access to 
social privileges protected by the citizenship provis , such as the pension 
system, public housing system, preferential loans etc. The loss of 
citizenship complicated the situation of young Koreans, who encountered 
numerous obstacles in their pursuit of education. The only way to 
overcome these problems was to naturalize. This solution, however, was 
neither welcomed by the Koreans, nor sincerely promoted by the Japanese 
administration. The Zainichi considered naturalization as an act of national 
betrayal. One needs to remember that in the 1950s and 1960s many 
Koreans continued living with the hope that some day they would be able 
to return to Korea and thus they treated Japan as atemporary home. 
Japanese officials shared exactly the same idea: thy expected the Koreans 
to pack their stuff and leave home – be it South or N th Korea. Rather 
than encouraging them to naturalize, the government discretely launched a 
program of mass repatriation to North Korea using Red Cross channels.2 
                                                   
2 For more about Japan’s involvement in the repatriation program to North Korea see Morris-
Suzuki (2007). 
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The Ministry of Home Affairs entrenched naturalizaton with various 
conditions, making the whole process long and humiliating for the 
applicant. Not only had the candidate to prove thate/she was a good 
citizen, but they were also expected to renounce their identity and adopt a 
Japanese name. Many Koreans found it unacceptable and therefore they 
chose to live with the status of foreigner. The two K rean organizations, 
Mindan and Chongryun, representing South and North Korea respectively, 
also discouraged Zainichi from applying for Japanese citizenship. 
In 1965, Japan established diplomatic relations with the Republic of Korea. 
This improved the situation of Zainichi, whose legal st tus so far had been 
unsettled. Japan granted the Koreans unionized in Mindan the status of 
permanent residents. Being less vulnerable to harassment by Japanese 
authorities the Koreans felt more encouraged to fight for their rights. In the 
1970s they began challenging the discriminatory practices of Japanese 
companies and public institutions. The case of Kim Kyŏng-dŭk was 
groundbreaking. Kim intended to become a lawyer. Having graduated from 
university, he applied in 1977 to the Legal Training & Research Center – 
an institution run by the Ministry of Justice, whic every lawyer candidate 
in Japan must graduate from before being admitted to the bar. The school 
refused to admit Kim, arguing that he did not meet the formal criteria 
because he lacked Japanese citizenship. Although the legal profession was 
not protected by the citizenship proviso, the school authorities argued that 
students of the Center had the status of public officials, and thus no 
foreigners could be admitted. Kim brought the case to court and won. Later 
he successfully graduated from the Center and opened a private legal 
bureau. It should be mentioned that Kim was not the first foreigner who 
was admitted to the bar. There were a number of Taiwanese among 
Japanese lawyers, but all of them had previously naturalized. Kim had the 
same choice. He was advised to adopt Japanese citiznship and then to 
apply to the Center, but he refused (Iwasawa 1998: 165; Lee & De Vos 
1981: 278-280, Lie 2008: 160). 
In the 1980s the Koreans launched a campaign against being fingerprinted 
by the Immigration Bureau. Taking fingerprints was a tandard procedure 
during the application for the Alien Registration Card. Such a card had to 
be carried by every foreign resident in Japan and its period of validity 
lasted only a couple of years. The Zainichi found it humiliating that each 
time they applied for the renewal of the card their fingerprints were taken 
as if they were criminals. Hence, they launched a move ent of 
disobedience, in spite of the legal and financial consequences. Eventually, 
in 1993, the Japanese government canceled the requirement of taking 
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fingerprints from so-called “special permanent resid nts” – a newly 
invented category of foreigners, which included the Korean and Taiwanese 
Zainichi (Iwasawa 1998: 147-150; Neary 2002: 53, Lie 2008: 108). 
In the 1980s the Zainichi raised the issue of Korean n mes. Japanese 
authorities maintained a very strict policy towards nomenclature and 
expected candidates for naturalization to choose a n w Japanese-like name 
and surname. Although there was no law requiring candidates to choose a 
Japanese name, officials as a rule suggested applicnts did so. The 
applicants, on the other hand, usually complied, fearing that otherwise their 
application might be rejected. In 1982 a group of naturalized Koreans 
applied for the restitution of their Korean surnames, but the court rejected 
their requests. In 1985, however, Japan revised the Nationality Law and the 
Family Registry Law, enabling Japanese citizens whomarried foreigners to 
adopt the surname of their spouses. This legitimized foreign surnames 
under Japanese law. Consequently, the naturalized Zainichi repeated their 
demands for the restitution of their surnames – this ime with success 
(Iwasawa 1998: 138-141). Since then Zainichi have become more likely to 
naturalize under their original names, despite pressure from the Japanese 
authorities. They have successfully challenged the principle that Japanese 
citizens must carry Japanese names. 
In the 1990s the Zainichi raised their demands for suffrage. Since they had 
been living in Japan for generations and paid taxes lik  other ordinary 
citizens, they argued, they should be allowed to participate in the affairs of 
local administration on an equal basis. In 1995 the High Court ruled that 
admitting foreigners to local elections would not violate the constitution, 
but left the decision of when to enact a new election law to the parliament. 
The Japanese government promised to change the election law, the South 
Korean government too got involved in the matter by exercising pressure 
on the Japanese government, but so far the issue has been shelved and not 
resolved (Takao 2003: 537). 
In recent years the government has significantly eased the naturalization 
procedure for Zainichi. As a consequence, the naturalization ratio has 
increased and the number of people registered as “special permanent 
residents” is gradually decreasing. The revision of the citizenship law in 
1985, which enabled children from mixed families to keep dual citizenship, 
also contributed to the drop in figures of the Zainichi. Yet, about 400.000 
Zainichi still prefer to live with foreigner status. It should be noted that 
with the generation shifts during the past fifty years the attitude of Zainichi 
toward Korea has dramatically changed and nowadays those who consider 
themselves “Korean nationals” belong to the minority. Most Zainichi do 
 69 
not identify themselves with either of the Korean states. They consider 
themselves as either members of the Korean diaspora, or being of Japanese 
or Korean descent. Nonetheless, they do not intend to give up their Korean 
identity, regardless of however they define their “Korean-ness”. Whether 
they naturalize or decide to keep their foreigner statu , they demand the 
Japanese state respect their Korean identity and allow them to function in 
Japanese society on an equal basis.3 
 
The Ainu 
The Ainu are the oldest minority in Japan. The Ainu’s homeland originally 
extended over Hokkaido, southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, but due 
to mass relocations and repatriations following border shifts between Japan 
and Russia it has shrunk to Hokkaido. In the Edo Period (1600-1868) the 
Ainu’s land lay beyond the borders of the Japanese state, but Japanese 
merchants vigorously exploited it for its natural resources. Commerce with 
the Japanese brought about tragic results for the Ainu. The Japanese made 
the most of their cultural and technological advancement to make the Ainu 
dependent on Japanese wares and consequently to subjugate them. 
Exploitation of the land shook Hokkaido’s ecosystem and distorted the 
Ainu’s traditional way of life.4 By the dawn of the Meiji Era (1868-1912) 
Ainu communities were living in distress, plagued by illnesses and alcohol 
misuse. Their situation deteriorated furthermore after the Meiji state 
launched the program of Hokkaido’s colonization. 
By the end of the 19th century, the situation of the Ainu was so serious that 
the government acknowledged that they would soon perish unless 
something was done. In 1899 the government implemented the Hokkaido 
Former Natives Protection Act. Its objective was to raise the Ainu from 
poverty by turning them into farmers, but in reality  brought about 
adverse effects. The Ainu had little experience and no interest in farming, 
hence they quickly disposed their plots which they received from the state. 
In the longer term, the Protection Act only contributed to the social 
marginalization of the Ainu. Japanese policymakers s emed to have come 
to terms with the idea that the Ainu’s culture was an unwanted remnant of 
the past and that the best solution for the Ainu was for them to assimilate 
and disappear in Japanese society. On the one hand t ey imposed a policy 
of Japanization, but on the other they implemented a policy of “positive 
segregation”: Ainu children attended separate schools until 1937 (Siddle 
1996: 72). 
                                                   
3 For more about Zainichi identity see Chapman (2004), Ryang (2000), Lie (2008).  
4 For further reading on this subject see Walker (2001). 
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In comparison to other minority groups, the Ainu became politically active 
relatively late. The Association of Hokkaido Ainu (Hokkaidō Ainu Kyōkai) 
was only established in 1930. This association, which worked under the 
paternalistic guidance of the prefectural authorities, was headed by the 
Japanese official Kita Masaaki, and it focused prima ly on promoting 
assimilation among the Ainu. Little was done to promote the protection of 
the Ainu’s heritage. Nonetheless, the association had some achievements: it 
forced the government to make some revisions in the Protection Act and to 
abolish segregation at school. 
The situation of the Ainu started improving remarkably only in the 1960s 
when the government launched a program of economic aid for Ainu 
communities. Since then, the Ainu have been lifted out of dire poverty, but 
nevertheless, nearly fifty years after the launch of the program, they 
continue to lag behind the social mainstream in nearly every social aspect 
(education, housing, incomes etc.). The government adopted a stance that 
substantial aid would be sufficient to solve the “Ainu issue” and therefore 
it resisted acknowledgement of the Ainu as an ethnic minority. This was 
quite a schizophrenic situation, as the Hokkaido Former Natives Protection 
Act of 1899 continued to be in force. Contrary to the expectations of 
Japanese policymakers, not only had the Ainu not given up their identity, 
but they had rediscovered their cultural heritage. This resulted in a revival 
of Ainu ethnicity. The Hokkaido Utari Association, which succeeded the 
Hokkaido Ainu Association in 1961, stopped looking at the government as 
the only partner and established closer ties with ot er organizations 
representing minorities in Japan, namely the Koreans d burakumin. In 
1978 and 1979, Ainu leaders toured the USA and Canada, investigating the 
situation of North America’s native people. The Ainu became more aware 
of their status as “indigenous people”. They adopted a new political 
strategy, emphasizing the matter of their indigenous ess. Improving their 
people’s living conditions, of course, remained the main objective of their 
movement, but they began to demand that the Japanese government 
recognize them as indigenous people, extend institutional protection of 
their cultural heritage, and to acknowledge Japan’s responsibility for the 
colonization of their ancestral land. In 1984 the Hokkaido Utari 
Association presented a resolution calling for the abolishment of the 
Hokkaido Former Natives Protection Act and prepared a draft of a new bill. 
The proposal stipulated that a number of seats in the Diet and in the 
Hokkaido prefectural assembly would be reserved for Ainu representatives 
– a condition that was unacceptable for the Japanese government 
(Tsunemoto 2001: 122). 
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Having established links with organizations of indigenous people overseas, 
the Ainu managed to gain international sympathy andsupport. Nomura 
Giichi, an Ainu activist, represented the Ainu at the UN during the 
inauguration of the International Year of the World’s Indigenous People in 
1992. Under pressure from the international community, the Japanese 
government eventually acknowledged the existence of the Ainu in a report 
to the UN Committee on Human Rights in 1992. This, owever, had no 
implication for domestic law. 
The Ainu’s cause received a positive impact after th  Liberal Democratic 
Party lost power in 1993. In 1994 Murayama Tomiichi of the Japan 
Socialist Party formed a cabinet. The JSP has traditionally been more 
sympathetic towards Japanese minorities. Murayama assigned the post of 
Chief Cabinet Secretary to Igarashi Kōzō, a former mayor of the city of 
Asahigawa, which had a substantial Ainu community. The position of the 
Ainu was strengthened further when Kayano Shigeru, an Ainu scholar and 
politician linked to the Social Democratic Party, was elected to the 
parliament. The following year Japan ratified the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. This created 
propitious conditions for the enactment of a new Ainu law. A council of 
experts was formed to prepare a draft, but, as it should be emphasized, no 
Ainu representative was invited to join the council. 
In March 1997 the government adopted the Ainu Culture Promotion Act,5 
which was enacted on the 1st of July. The new law replaced the old 
Hokkaido Former Natives Protection Act and obligated the government to 
undertake appropriate measures to promote Ainu cultre. The law, however, 
did not explicitly recognize the Ainu as an ethnic minority, it speaks only 
about Ainu culture (the Ainu are referred to as Ainu no hitobito, or Ainu 
people, where the word hitobito is a plural form of “man” with no 
connotation of nationhood or ethnicity).6 Naturally, it did not grant any 
collective rights to the Ainu. The Hokkaido Utari Association welcomed 
the new law, but not without criticism. The enactment of the Ainu Culture 
Promotion Act was a groundbreaking event, as it challenged the notion of 
Japan’s homogeneity on legal bases, but without significant changes in the 
Ainu’s position. As Richard Siddle (2002, 2003) noted, the Japanese state, 
as the main sponsor, retains the function of authorizing the shape of Ainu 
culture, and by doing so, it usurps the right to define “Ainu-ness”. 
                                                   
5 Ainu bunka no shinkō narabi ni Ainu no dentō nado ni kansuru chishiki no fukyū oyobi keihatsu 
ni kansuru hōritsu (Act for the Promotion of Ainu Culture, the Dissemination of Knowledge of 
Ainu Traditions, and an Education Campaign). English translation after Siddle (2002: 406). 
6 See the original text: http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/H09/H09HO052.html [access on 3.3.2011] 
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The Cultural Promotion Act did not satisfy the Ainu and thus they 
continued their struggle for recognition as indigenous people. They scored 
a small, but important victory, when in March 1997 the Sapporo District 
Court handed down the verdict in the so-called Nibutani Dam Case. The 
case concerned the appropriation of land in Nibutani village in the 1980s, 
where the state planned to construct a dam. The village was mostly 
inhabited by the Ainu and some of them, including the above-mentioned 
Kayano Shigeru, refused to voluntarily sell their land. Then they sued the 
government on the basis that Nibutani was a historical site where many 
Ainu festivals were observed. By appropriating the land, they argued, the 
government violated their cultural rights. The court ruled that the 
government’s decision to appropriate the Ainu land ha indeed been illegal, 
and although it could not nullify the decision, as the dam had already been 
completed, it ordered the government to pay compensation. More 
importantly, the court created a precedence, becaus in the verdict the Ainu 
were referred to as “indigenous people” (senjū minzoku).7 
It took a decade before the Ainu finally gained recognition as an ethnic 
minority. In September 2007 the United Nations adopted the Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The following year, the Diet 
unanimously adopted a resolution calling for the recognition of the Ainu as 
an indigenous people. In this resolution, Japan admitted that the Ainu were 
the first inhabitants of Hokkaido and accepted the “ istorical fact that 
whilst equal in law to all other Japanese citizens, i  the process of Japan’s 
modernization, countless Ainu persons were discriminated against, and 
forced to live in great poverty” (Stevens 2008: 49). So far the resolution 
has had no substantial implications, but the future will show if it was the 
next step in the Ainu’s struggle for collective rights. 
 
The Okinawans 
With 1.3 million people, the Okinawans are the largest ethnic minority in 
Japan. In many respects they are the most powerful. They have their own 
homeland, Okinawa prefecture, where they constitute an absolute majority 
and are in charge of local administration. No other minority enjoys the 
political luxury of having a constitutionally guaranteed representation in 
the Diet. And yet the Okinawans do not use their political potential to 
assert their rights as an “ethnic minority”, “nation”, or “indigenous people”. 
The so-called “Okinawa struggle” (Okinawa tōsō) seems to be primarily 
about military bases and economic issues. Undoubtedly, the Okinawans 
skillfully use nationalistic rhetoric, which sometimes makes a misleading 
                                                   
7 For more on this subject see Tsunemoto (2001), Siddle (2002, 2003). 
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impression that in Okinawa there is a strong pro-independence movement. 
But behind this nationalistic façade there are no demands for any collective 
rights designed specifically for Okinawan people. The struggle against 
bases is being conducted under the banner of the fig t against Okinawa’s 
oppression, and also in the name of the universal fight or human rights, 
women’s rights and environmental protection. Its ulimate goal is to restore 
full citizenship rights to local people, so that they can live free of fear and 
all problems related to the presence of military bases. 
Looking back at Okinawan modern history, we discover that the struggle 
for Japanese citizenship has always been prioritized in the political life of 
Okinawa. After the annexation of the Ryukyu Kingdom in 1879, the 
Japanese government hesitated about integrating Okinawa and therefore 
Okinawa retained semi-colonial status until the beginning of the 20th 
century. There were many reasons why the government had delayed the 
process of integration, but to the great satisfaction of Tokyo, Okinawan 
people quickly embraced Japanese rule and began promoting a policy of 
assimilation out of their own initiative. Having adopted Japanese identity, 
the Okinawans started to raise complaints against their treatment as 
second-rate nationals. Teachers, journalists and officials launched a 
campaign to introduce suffrage and adjust the system of governance to the 
standards employed in Japan proper. Interestingly, the word “autonomy” 
frequently appeared in their arguments, but what they understood by 
“autonomy” was not a type of self-governance that would have respected 
Okinawa’s socio-cultural distinctiveness, but “sameness” and “equality”; 
they wanted for Okinawa exactly the same status and s me rights as other 
prefectures in Japan. This concept of autonomy requir d that Okinawa had 
first to assimilate and level all cultural differences as far as was possible. 8 
Eventually the Okinawans achieved what they wanted: in 1912, Okinawa 
received suffrage with two seats in the Diet and by 1920 all administrative 
differences between the prefecture and Japan proper were abolished. 
Nonetheless, Okinawa remained the poorest region in the country 
throughout the whole prewar period, with the lowest incomes per capita 
and poorly developed infrastructure. The Japanese continued to 
discriminate against Okinawan people, seeing them as country-bumpkins, 
who perhaps were Japanese, but whose manners and behavior were 
bringing shame to the civilized people of Japan. The emotional gap 
between the Okinawans and the Japanese deepened in the 1920s, when an 
economic crisis forced thousands of Okinawans to migrate to Japan proper 
                                                   
8 I discuss in detail the topic of Okinawa’s assimilation during the prewar period in Meyer (2007). 
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and abroad. Okinawan migrant workers received treatm n  similar to that 
of the Taiwanese and Koreans. 
After World War II, Okinawa was detached from Japan and placed under 
American military occupation. The Americans hoped to keep Okinawa 
permanently and hence they tried to revive – or better say to invent – the 
Ryukyuan nation.9 Yet the plan of “un-Japanizing” Okinawa failed. The 
more the Okinawans felt disappointed with American rule, the more they 
looked north towards their neighbors in Japan, despite fresh memories of 
how the Japanese state had spilled their blood during the Battle of Okinawa. 
By the beginning of the 1960s, the Reversion Movement b came a major 
political force in Okinawa and it became clear to Washington that sooner or 
later the issue of Okinawa’s occupation would have to be solved. In the 
meantime, the Okinawan local authorities undertook certain steps to ensure 
that Okinawa would not cut its ties with Japan. For example, the legal 
system was to a great extent copied from the Japanese. The Japanese civil 
code and the so-called Family Registry Law (kosekihō) were reintroduced 
almost without changes. This was a significant factbecause in Japan the 
Family Registry Law is strictly correlated with the citizenship law – family 
registers (koseki) represent a legal confirmation of Japanese citizenship. By 
adopting the koseki system the Okinawans prepared the ground for the 
smooth restitution of Japanese citizenship in the future – after the reversion 
the Japanese government simply recognized the Okinawan registers.10 
The struggle for reversion abounded with many dramatic events. Accidents 
and crimes committed by the American military personnel furthermore 
heated the atmosphere on the island. People protested and rallied nearly on 
a daily basis, sometimes resorting to violence, as happened in the city of 
Koza on the night of December 20, 1970, when an angry crowd clashed 
with American MPs, setting fire to American vehicles and facilities. 
The Okinawan people welcomed Reversion Day on May 15, 1972 with a 
dose of reservation, fearing that Okinawa might be re-colonized by the 
Japanese capital. Yet they quickly embraced the Japanese “construction 
state” (Hook and Siddle 2003: 5), which poured billions of yen into 
Okinawa’s infrastructure. With the rise of living standards, anti-Japanese 
feelings, which had resurfaced with double the force on the eve of the 
reversion, gradually declined. Tokyo relatively easily ubdued the anti-
bases opposition by raising compensation for landlords of occupied land 
and offering financial aid to local communities through public construction 
                                                   
9 To find out more about the Americans’ attempts to “un-Japanize” Okinawa see Rabson (1999) 
and Obermiller (2000). 
10 More on this subject see Kugai (1990) and Okuyama (2006). 
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works. Soon, Okinawa became, on its own wishes, hostage of Japanese 
subsidiaries, which successfully prevented people from forming a unified 
front against the bases. And here comes the question: why is it that during 
the American occupation the Okinawans were able to form a popular 
movement, whilst after the reversion their struggle seems to have lost 
impetus and the anti-bases movement became weak and fragmented? The 
answer is not simply “the money”. 
If we compare the pre-reversion and post-reversion periods, we may find 
the following difference. During the American occupation, people were 
more eager to violate public order and to resort to violence (although the 
riots in Koza were an exception). This demonstrated the high level of 
people’s desperation. In a broader sense, people rejected the quasi-
citizenship bestowed by the American military authorities and therefore 
they did not hesitate to revolt despite the legal and economic consequences. 
This changed – though not immediately – after the reve sion. However 
dissatisfied with Japanese citizenship, people have accepted it and thus 
they have refrained from challenging Japan’s constitutional framework. In 
other words, they have changed their strategy to conduct their struggle in 
conformity with the law. No one wants to risk jail for the cause – and this 
is what makes Okinawans different from Zainichi Koreans, who risked 
high penalties when launching the disobedience moveent against 
fingerprinting. 
Governor Ōta Masahide’s “revolt” in 1995-96 and the G8 Summit in 2000 
illustrate well the characteristics of the Okinawans’ struggle against bases. 
In September 1995, at the heyday of anti-American protests that were 
ignited by a rape incident committed by three American servicemen on a 
teenage girl, Governor Ōta announced he would refuse to renew the lease 
of land used by the American facilities, even though he was obligated to do 
as a proxy of the government. The government faced an embarrassing 
situation that after the expiration of lease agreemnts the Americans would 
occupy the land illegally and thus it quickly brought Ōta to court. In the 
meantime, Ōta raised a campaign of support for his action thatled to a 
prefectural referendum on September 8, in which citizens of Okinawa 
clearly expressed their voice against the bases. The referendum was legally 
non-binding, but the Okinawans sent a clear message to Tokyo. Yet Ōta’s 
“revolt” received a severe blow just a few days befor  the referendum took 
place when the Supreme Court ruled that Ōta’s refusal to sign the lease 
agreements was illegal. Ōta waited for the outcome of the referendum, but 
then, to the great confusion of many people, he flew to Tokyo to meet 
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Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō and to announce that he would 
cooperate with the government.11 
Did he have any other choice? He claimed that he didn’t. He was afraid 
that the parliament might pass special legislation hat would simplify the 
land-lease procedure by taking the governor out of the loop, and this would 
have weakened Okinawa’s position. Undoubtedly, if he continued to revolt 
he would have faced legal consequences and, in the short-term, put his 
political career at risk. By conforming to the rule of the Supreme Court, 
Ōta demonstrated that he was not willing to challenge the constitutional 
order. After all, he invoked the constitution when t stifying at the Supreme 
Court on July 10, 1996: 
In Okinawa there are about 1.27 million Japanese nationals. Although this 
lawsuit [formally] concerns the prime minister’s orde  to a prefectural 
governor to carry out certain duties, I believe that it implies issues of basic 
human rights such as constitutionally guaranteed property rights, people’s 
right to a life in peace, and [the prefectures’] right to home rule. (…) 
Okinawa’s base issue is not peculiar to one local area – Okinawa – but is 
eminently general as Japan’s problem, with implications for sovereignty 
and democracy. (…) I would like to note that my peol  expect the 
Supreme Court, as the guardian of the constitution, t  render a positive 
judgment concerning the military base issue in Okinawa. I sincerely 
request the Supreme Court to examine the past and present of my people 
who, denied the benefits of the Constitutional principles, have been living 
under the oppression of military bases (…). (Ota 2000: 251, 253-54)  
In exchange for co-operation the government offered Okinawa a package 
of funds to bolster the local economy and made a promise to close the 
Futenma Airbase – an American base that is located in the middle of the 
densely populated city of Ginowan. In the meantime, Governor Ōta lost the 
elections and was replaced by a Tokyo-backed businessman, Inamine 
Kei’ichi. In order to placate people, Prime Minister Obuchi Keizō 
designated Okinawa to host the G8 Summit in 2000. Special measures 
were taken to refresh local infrastructure before th Summit and to 
promote Okinawa to the world. Okinawa received its five minutes. 
Despite a rare opportunity to address their problems in front of the whole 
world, the Okinawan people used it to please the government. Local 
politicians, officials and ordinary citizens mobilized enormous support for 
the Summit. Rather than demonstrating against the bas s, the Okinawans 
preferred to promote an idyllic image of Okinawa – a tropical paradise 
inhabited by friendly and peace-loving people. Demonstrations against the 
                                                   
11 Ōta’s “revolt” has been discussed by Eldridge (1997) and Mulgan (2000). 
 77 
bases were carefully orchestrated so that they would not distort the 
harmonious atmosphere of the Summit. The main demonstration – the 
Kadena Human Chain Rally, in which 27,000 people gathered together – 
turned into a familial happening, where veterans of the Reversion 
Movement took their small grandchildren for a picnic to recall the good old 
times when they were young and rebellious. All in all, it was a very 
peaceful and “boring” Summit, with a barely visible presence of 
antiglobalists and Green Peace activists.12 
For one reason the G8 Summit was a remarkable event: President Clinton 
was the second acting president of the US to set foot on Okinawan soil. 
The first was Dwight Eisenhower, who visited Okinawa forty years earlier 
in 1960. These two visits were strikingly different and symbolically 
demonstrate the changes in the anti-bases movement. Eisenhower’s visit 
was accompanied by mass demonstrations. He met with suc  a hostile 
reception that he left Okinawa after just a few hours and remembered this 
visit as one of his worst experiences in his presidential career. President 
Clinton, on the other hand, received an extraordinaily warm reception. He 
caught Okinawans’ heart when he carved out one hourfr m his busy 
schedule to visit the Peace Memorial Park and pay respect to the victims of 
the Battle of Okinawa (Clinton arrived in Okinawa one day later than 
originally scheduled due to the prolonging of the Palestinian-Israeli 
negotiations at Camp David). Apart from a small group f radical students, 
no one wanted to protest against the visit of an American president. 
The Okinawa struggle is nowadays centered around the problem of the 
Futenma Airbase which the Japanese and American authorities plan to 
relocate to Nago in the north of Okinawa. Looking back at the past fifteen 
years we can see significant changes in the Okinawas’ strategy: they have 
joined forces with environmentalists and human rights activists, they also 
moved the battleground from Japan to the USA, where they successfully 
blocked the Futenma relocation project at a court in California (Tanji 2008). 
Nonetheless, their struggle has little to do with bargaining for special 
collective rights. All the Okinawans want is to exercise their civil rights as 
stipulated by the Japanese law and constitution. 
 
Conclusions 
Now comes a question: why is it that the Okinawans, Ainu and Koreans 
employ different strategies when negotiating their cit zenship rights? Why 
is it that the Ainu and Koreans have challenged the institution of 
citizenship that had been unilaterally defined by the Japanese state, 
                                                   
12 These are my personal observations from the G8 Summit and the Kadena Human Chain Rally. 
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whereas the Okinawans have seemed to embrace it? How can we explain 
the shift in Okinawans’ strategy from radicalism in the 1960s towards 
today’s compromise? The answers are very complex, but we may try to 
draw some conclusions. 
In the case of the Koreans, we must consider their strong nationalism that 
had no equivalent in Okinawa. Since the late 19th century, the Koreans 
have boasted a strong identity, which was further strengthened by the 
experience of the Japanese colonial occupation. After World War II, the 
two Korean organizations in Japan, Mindan and Chongryun, made efforts 
to cultivate national identity among the Zainichi and discouraged people 
from naturalizing. Chongryun engaged in building Korean schools and 
encouraged the Zainichi to repatriate to North Korea. The first and second 
generations of Zainichi treated Japan as a temporary home, waiting until 
the political situation on the peninsula normalized. Only gradually did they 
start to consider Japan as their homeland and it took a long time until they 
started identifying themselves with Japanese society. But they continue to 
maintain their identity and demand that their Korean-ness is somehow 
acknowledged by Japanese law. 
The Ainu were imbued with the identity of a people who had failed to meet 
the challenges of the modern world. It is worth noting that before the war 
the Ainu had enjoyed a legal status theoretically higher than that of 
Koreans or Taiwanese, but nonetheless they did not escape the institutional 
differentiation (The Hokkaido Former Natives Protection Act, “positive 
discrimination” at schools). Secondly, the Ainu entered modern times with 
a burden of negative stereotypes and prejudices held by the Japanese, being 
depicted as subhuman. Japanese national ideology, which became strongly 
influenced by racism and theories of social evolutinism, placed the Ainu 
in the category of primitive natives – at best semi-civilized people. Thirdly, 
for the Ainu modernization was a much more shocking a d disastrous 
experience in comparison to that of the Okinawans ad Koreans. If the 
latter had been forced to make a jump from agrarian to i dustrial times, the 
Ainu at the dawn of the Meiji Era had been still at the stage of pre-agrarian 
societies, with no experience of statehood. This situation was eagerly 
exploited by Japanese colonizers who stripped the Ainu of their ancestral 
land and destroyed the traditional base of their livelihood. In that sense, the 
Ainu shared a fate similar to that of the indigenous people in Australia and 
America. With the typical manner of indigenous peopl , they created a 
strong identity, initially rejecting the state that had colonized them. 
Eventually, the Ainu started making use of their ‘indigenousness’; they 
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established cooperation with organizations of Native Americans and 
employed similar strategies in bargaining collective rights. 
The situation of the Okinawans, on the other hand, has been different. The 
Okinawans lost their independent Kingdom, but they r latively easily 
embraced Japanese rule and adopted Japanese identity. After all, Japanese 
rule in Okinawa was not so harsh and disastrous for the local people as it 
was in Korea and Hokkaido – although in the long-term it led to the 
catastrophe of the Battle of Okinawa in 1945. What is important, the 
Okinawans welcomed modernization and eagerly promoted it. Since the 
Meiji Era, Japan has always been a source of modernity a d an example 
for emulation. There remains of course the question of what happened to 
Okinawan nationalism. It is not easy to explain why t e Okinawans did not 
raise any strong nationalism that would have demanded loosening ties with 
Japan, not to speak of divorce, but at least we can le rn from Ernest 
Gellner that the Okinawan case is not unusual.13 Considering the cultural, 
linguistic and ethnic diversity of the world, only a small number of people 
managed to form a nation and the rest joined other nations – often out of 
their own will. Gellner made a point in noting that modernization and the 
rise of modern nations were mutually dependent processes. Where people 
allocated their “national” sentiments depended much on where they found 
“modernity”. In the case of Okinawa the ticket to mdernity lay in Japan 
and hence there was a strong push in Okinawan society towards 
assimilation and Japanization. In short, for the Okinawans Japan became a 
“desired” homeland, and this is what makes them different from the Ainu 
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